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screaming. Where I looked over, there was a guy that was on fire, so I ran over and I tried to put the fire out on him. And he was screaming.
I just told him to roll, roll, and he said he couldn't. And then another guy came over . . . and put the flames out on him. (CBS News 2002: 17) It was about two minutes past nine.
Gumbel switched to a third eyewitness, Theresa Renaud, who was watching the World Trade Center from her apartment at Eighth Ave nue and Sixteenth Street, about two miles north of the Center. "Ap proximately ten minutes ago," reported Renaud, there was a major explosion from about the 80th floor-looks like it's affected probably four to eight floors. Major flames are coming out of the north side and also the east side of the building. It was a very loud explosion, followed by flames, and it looks like the building is still on fire on the inside. GUMBEL: Why do you say that was definitely on purpose? RENAUD: Because it just flew straight into it. (CBS News 2002: 18) Filmmaker Jules Naudet, who had been producing a documentary on a downtown Manhattan fire company, had gone to the scene with the battalion chief after the first plane crashed into the World Trade Center. He was filming firefighters' actions in the lobby of the North Tower, the first tower hit, when the second aircraft struck the other tower: "Suddenly we heard an explosion coming from outside, and as I turned to look out the windows, I saw flaming debris falling in chapter one the courtyard and then heard a radio call announcing that Tower 2 had been hit by another plane. Any thought that this was simply a terrible accident vanished: New York was under attack" (CBS News 2002: 23) . Washington, D.C., was also under attack. A perplexing calamity had begun.
When commandeered commercial aircraft crashed into New
York's World Trade Center, Washington's Pentagon, and a Pennsyl vania field that September morning, people across the world began asking for reasons why. Why had someone perpetrated this vicious violence? Why had they targeted the United States? Why hadn't American authorities prevented the assault? Observers quickly shifted from simply making sense of what was happening to seeking reasons for the disaster. Direct participants faced the double chal lenge of finding reasons both for the terrible episode as a whole and for the specific incidents they had suffered, witnessed, or caused.
On the scene, emergency workers activated their routines without asking too many questions. Only as they worked did they start search ing seriously for credible reasons for the disaster they were seeing. New York Fire Department Paramedic Gary Smiley, for example, was working overtime in downtown Brooklyn when the radio in his ambulance broadcast word that a plane had hit the 110-story North Tower (Tower 1) of the World Trade Center. The call had come at 8:48 AM. Within a few minutes, Smiley's crew rushed across the Brooklyn Bridge to Manhattan.
Smiley set up a triage area between the two towers. He was car rying an injured woman who had just left Tower 1 across the street when the woman started shouting "Plane." He looked up and saw the second aircraft hit the South Tower (Tower 2). It was 9:03 AM, just seventeen minutes after the first crash. Debris began falling on them, so partway across the street he pushed the woman to the ground and threw himself on top of her. A severed, burning human people not only accepted his reasons, but also acted on them at once.
He moved his ambulance to a safer location, evaded the falling bodies of people who were jumping to their deaths from the highest floors of the North Tower, and started into the tower for rescue operations.
At that point (9:50 AM) the South Tower fell into flaming ruins.
Soon after the South Tower fell, Smiley was going to the rescue of other paramedics who were trapped in the tower's rubble. That work, however, ended fast. A rush of air from the sudden collapse (at 10:29 AM) of the North Tower picked Smiley up and slammed him to the pavement. He crawled under a truck, thinking he might die in the suffocating dust. Then, according to his recollections, he grew angry as he remembered how his father had died in a random street robbery three years earlier, and reflected on how his own death would hit his two children. Again a click:
My mind just switched at that point, and I think that's really what gave me a desire to get out of there. Something just clicked, and I thought, I know I'm not going to die today. I'm going to get out of here.
You know how people say, "God had other plans for you." I think it was my father who had other plans for me. He had to be looking out for me, and I just started digging. I don't know how long I was under the truck before I figured this out, but I started crawling my way out of there, digging through the rocks and the debris. Just as I got out, a chapter one fireman who had also been lodged in the debris had gotten himself out.
Both of us staggered around. (Fink and Mathias 2002: 34) With all of his exposed skin burned, Smiley made it to a delicatessen on North End Avenue, where a number of injured police and fire fighters had already sought refuge. There they heard explosions, and gave reasons for them: "One of the cops thought that it might be secondary explosions. When terrorists do this sort of thing, they'll put secondary bombs around to kill the rescue workers. I looked back out. I saw the damage. At that point, I could hear aviation and the pilots yelling on the radio that it was a commercial airliner. I realized at that minute that we were under attack. I yelled to John [Picci ano, his chief of staff] to get on the telephone to call headquarters, but there was no phone service. The cell phones were down, so we're calling on the radio. I'm yelling for them to get aviation to close down the airspace. We needed air support, and I'm screaming at these guys to get me air support.
They're looking at me, like "Is there a fucking number to call for an F-16?" Like "Who do we call? How do we do that?" But aviation had taken care of that and closed down the airspace. They had called in the military. I ordered the entire city to be shut down at that point. All bridges and tunnels closed. No entry. No exit. My main concern at that point was that there could be other secondary attacks set up on the ground. They're hitting us from above, did they do any thing on the ground? Are they on the ground? My other concern was who the hell they were. Who are they? You know, as all of these events were unfolding, you're trying to put it all together. You're trying to think of so many things at once. (Fink and Mathias 2002: 110-11) Soon Mayor Rudolph Giuliani joined Kerik. 
What Reasons for This Book?
As eyewitnesses at the World Trade Center and Pentagon searched for reasons, they followed an extremely general human routine. We might even define human beings as reason-giving animals. While, by some definitions, other primates employ language, tools, and even culture, only humans start offering and demanding reasons while young, then continue through life looking for reasons why.
Reasons provide organized answers to the question "Why does (did, should) X do Y?" X can be you as you tell me why you arrived late for our rendezvous, me as I explain my winning of the lottery, or the hijackers who piloted aircraft into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. X need not be a person or people; X can be God, evil spirits, Islam, communism, or just plain Them. X sometimes means individuals, groups, organizations, categories, forces, or invisible entities. X produces Y.
The World Trade Center disaster provoked reason giving at multi ple levels, including:
• Why did the hijackers seize the aircraft and crash them into the towers?
• Why did the buildings burst into flames and collapse?
• (In the case of a participant) Why did I behave as I did? Why did we (whatever the we) behave as we did?
• (In the cases of participants and observers) why did other people (considered as individuals or as groups) behave as they did?
• What causes terrorism?
• What causes violence in general?
immigrant as housekeeper and nanny without filing tax reports on her. After another couple of weeks' brouhaha, Kerik also resigned from Giuliani's prosperous post-9/11 security consulting firm, saying that unfair allegations concerning the nanny, his love life, and past associations with criminals were hurting the firm. At least those were the reasons he gave: Lipton and Rashbaum 2004, Rashbaum and Dwyer 2004. 9 why give reasons?
Moving among multiple levels, this book looks sympathetically but searchingly at reason giving. It asks how, why, and in what different ways people supply reasons for the things they do, that others do, that happen to them, or that happen to other people-not so much grand general reasons for life, evil, or human frailty as the concrete reasons that different sorts of people supply or accept as they go about their daily business, deal with hardship, pass judgment on each other, or face emergencies such as the 9/11 disaster.
The book you are starting to read focuses on the social side of reason giving: how people share, communicate, contest, and collec tively modify accepted reasons rather than how individual nervous systems process new information as it comes in. It worries little about whether the reasons people give are right or wrong, good or bad, plausible or implausible. Instead, it concentrates on the social process of giving reasons. Nor does it spend much time on general intellec tual discussions of why things occur as they do, much less on how to resolve broad disagreements about reasons for big events.
The attacks of 9/11 inspired plenty of debate. "There is no disput ing," comment the editors of a volume concerning the implications of 9/11, "that the underlying significance of September 11 can only be comprehended when placed in its full context, yet the boundaries of that context are themselves hotly contested" (Hershberg and Moore 2002: 1). Seriously proposed reasons for 9/11, the editors go on to say, include al-Qaeda fanaticism, misguided American foreign policy, peculiar characteristics of Middle Eastern regimes, collapse of a previously stable (if dangerous) world order, and more. All those themes sound quite familiar to me. Most of my own professional work involves sorting out reasons for political processes at a broad scale: why revolutions occur, what causes democratization and dedemocratization, why terrorism takes its many forms, and so on. In stead of sorting out such broad political questions, however, this book chapter one concentrates on the social process of giving reasons at the person-to person scale. Reason giving turns out to be momentous at this scale as well.
Giving of reasons, as we will soon see, connects people with each other even when observers might find the reasons flimsy, contrived, or fantastic. In uncertain situations such as the 9/11 attacks, most people first adapt reasons for what is happening from models they have already learned through interaction with other people. Available models vary dramatically from group to group, situation to situation, and relation to relation. Regardless of their content, however, reasons provide rationales for behaving one way or another and shared ac counts of what is happening. They also make statements about rela tions between the people giving and receiving those reasons.
Look again at reason giving on 9/11 at the World Trade Center. At least emergency workers and city officials had previous experience, available categories, and established routines to draw on as they sought reasons for what was happening. People who worked in the towers generally had much less to go on. Even savvy Chuck Allen shifted his reasons as the disaster unfolded.
Allen ran computer operations at Lava Trading, on the 83rd floor of the North Tower. Allen was also a licensed pilot and a ham radio operator. When he saw a plane flying low south along the Hudson River about 8:45 AM, he was surprised, but supposed that it was ap proaching Newark Airport. A moment later, however, he noticed the familiar sound of a pilot gunning the aircraft's engine, then heard a roar as the plane hit the building thirteen floors above him. The building started shuddering, debris began falling, and fires fed by cascading airplane fuel broke out.
In answer to his computer programmer's frightened question over the intercom, Allen shouted, "A jet-helicopter hit the building, I think" (Der Spiegel 2001: 48) . Later, as he and others clattered down 11 why give reasons?
stairways from the 83rd floor, he tried sending out Mayday signals on the two-way radio he carried with him:
As soon as he had established contact he was thrown off the air: "All traffic has been cleared to keep frequencies clear for emergency calls.
Get off the frequency." They thought he was playing around. From the bits of conversation he was able to gather that an American Airlines jet had hit the towers. He didn't get it. "Okay. Planes crash, let's face it.
But why into the towers? The pilot had the whole Hudson River, for God's sake. What was wrong with this guy?" (Der Spiegel 2001: 55) After Allen led a group down the stairs from the 83rd floor and exited into the plaza north of the building, a police officer told him "We to catch her if she should fall, and I walked behind her, holding on to chapter one the knot so she would not fall. We walked 88 floors that way. When we got down to the 76th floor, the stairs led to a crossover corridor that was designed to create a smoke barrier. It was about 50 feet long and had a fire-rated door at each end to provide a smoke-proof enclosure.
We went through the first door, but the second door wouldn't open. I kicked it a dozen times but it wouldn't budge. I started to think that maybe this was part of the terrorist plot-that they had calculated in their minds that people would be trying to escape, so they had locked the stairwell doors. In reality, I figured out later, the jolt of the plane hitting the building probably racked and jammed the door. (Murphy 2002: 52-53) Gaeta first thought that terrorists had plotted the disaster down to the last detail. As a trained architect, however, he later complicated the story; he brought in unanticipated consequences of the crash.
At least as they later told their tales, many of the survivors that Dean Murphy, Mitchell Fink, Lois Mathias, and Der Spiegel's report ers interviewed for their vivid books of 9/11 memoirs reported almost immediately coding the disaster they had experienced as a terrorist attack. Perhaps that was because American courts had already con the World Trade Center's Marriott Hotel when American Airlines Flight 11 struck the adjacent North Tower. The Browns evacuated quickly. Richard Brown later reported: "After the planes had hit the buildings and we were waiting in Battery Park, I had told them it was like Pearl Harbor. They understand these things sometimes in terms of recent blockbuster movies. I told them it was like Pearl Harbor and Titanic combined" (Murphy 2002: 110) . For interviewed survivors, at least, the reasons for their terrible experience did not seem far to seek. Terrorists had tried to do them in, and had almost succeeded.
On further reflection, survivors and witnesses often elaborated their stories. Kimberly Morales, a senior at nearby Borough of Man hattan Community College, for example, had second thoughts. From close to her school she saw the airplane crash, the explosion, the fire, and eventually the North Tower's collapse. She also saw desperate people jump from the building to their deaths. On her way back to the Bronx: "It was an emotional trip home. I thought a lot about politics. I was really mad and didn't know where to direct my anger.
Where were the people in our government whose jobs were to pre vent things like this? Were they off in their million-dollar yachts and fancy vacations while we were suffering through this?" (Murphy 2002: 128) . The search for reasons led rapidly to assessments of re sponsibility and blame. Even if unnamed terrorists piloted their com mandeered aircraft into the twin towers, the Pentagon, and a Penn sylvania field, someone else's dereliction had allowed them to seize the aircraft.
Public officials engaged in a similar search for reasons, responsibil ity, and blame. In the course of a widely praised press conference on September 11, New York's Mayor Giuliani placed the reasons in context: "I believe that the people in New York City can demonstrate our resolve and our support for all of the people that were viciously chapter one attacked today by going about their lives and showing everyone that vicious, cowardly terrorists can't stop us from being a free country and a place that functions. And we'll do everything we can to make that point" (Adler and Adler 2002: 9). The reasons-"vicious, cow ardly terrorists" who sought to destroy the functioning of "a free country"-dictated the proper reaction, calm determination.
The same day, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell issued a similar first response to the attacks: "Once again we see terrorism; we see terrorists, people who don't believe in democracy, people who believe that with the destruction of buildings, with the murder of people, they can somehow achieve a political purpose. They can destroy buildings, they can kill people, and we will be saddened by this trag edy, but they will never be allowed to kill the spirit of democracy. They cannot destroy our society. They cannot destroy our belief in the democratic way" (State 2001b). The tragedy occurred, according to Secretary Powell, because terrorists with twisted minds thoughtwrongly-that they could shake American resolve by destroying American public buildings. In his address to Congress nine days after the devastating attacks of 9/11, U.S. President George W. Bush elab orated on Powell's reasons by identifying the culprits and associating them with villains across the world. "Our war on terror," declared Bush, "begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated" (State 2002: i).
Varieties of Reasons
Whether public officials, emergency workers, or community college students, people do not give themselves and others reasons because of some universal craving for truth or coherence. They often settle for reasons that are superficial, contradictory, dishonest, or-at least 15 why give reasons?
from an observer's viewpoint-farfetched. Whatever else they are doing when they give reasons, people are clearly negotiating their social lives. They are saying something about relations between themselves and those who hear their reasons. Giver and receiver are confirming, negotiating, or repairing their proper connection.
Commonly given reasons fall into four overlapping categories. Each of the four ways of giving reasons has distinctive properties. Each of them varies in content depending on social relations between giver and receiver. Each of them, among other consequences, exerts effects on those social relations, confirming an existing relation, re pairing that relation, claiming a new relation, or denying a relational claim. But the four sorts of reason giving differ significantly in form and content. Each can be valid in a way that the others cannot.
Conventions involve no pretense of providing adequate causal ac counts. If I start explaining in detail why I spilled my coffee on your newspaper-how I had a bad night's sleep, have been worrying about chapter one my job, recently developed a tremor it is hard to control-you may well become impatient. "Oops, I'm such a klutz!" may suffice, espe cially if I offer to get you a fresh newspaper. ("Sorry, I tripped on the rug" might also do.) Conventions vary enormously according to the social circumstances; given an identical dereliction, deviation, or good fortune, for example, a reason that satisfies a seatmate on the bus will usually not placate one's spouse. Conventions claim, confirm, repair, or deny social relations. They therefore differ greatly de pending on the social relations currently in play.
Exceptional events and unfamiliar phenomena, however, call up different reasons why; they call up stories. People experiencing an egregious failure, a signal victory, a spectacular faux pas, a shared tragedy, or mysterious sounds in the night do not settle for "It was just the breaks." They, too, try to match reasons to the circumstances and social relations at hand, but now the reasons take on weight.
Similarly, major life transitions such as marriage, divorce, or the death of a parent call for weightier accounts than conventions pro vide. In general, reasons for exceptional events complement explana tions with at least hints of justification or condemnation: the com pany gave me a bigger bonus than you because I worked harder and sold more computers. Implied claims concerning the quality, inten sity, durability, and propriety of relations between givers and receiv ers far exceed the claims tied to conventions.
Stories matter greatly for social life because of three distinctive characteristics. First, they rework and simplify social processes so that the processes become available for the telling; X did Y to Z conveys a memorable image of what happened. Second, they include strong imputations of responsibility, and thus lend themselves to moral eval uations: I get the credit, he gets the blame, they did us dirt. This second feature makes stories enormously valuable for evaluation after the fact, and helps account for people's changing stories of events in which they behaved less than heroically. Third, stories belong to the why give reasons? relationships at hand, and therefore vary from one relationship to another; a television interviewer gets a different story of a lost foot ball game from the one that players tell each other.
Further, stories truncate cause-effect connections. They typically call up a limited number of actors whose dispositions and actions cause everything that happens within a delimited time and space. The actors sometimes include supernatural beings and mysterious forces-for example, in witchcraft as an explanation of misfortunebut the actors' dispositions and actions explain what happened. As a consequence, stories inevitably minimize or ignore the causal roles of errors, unanticipated consequences, indirect effects, incremental effects, simultaneous effects, feedback effects, and environmental ef fects (Tilly 1995 (Tilly , 1996 . They conform to dominant modes of story telling. In fact, most of the early reason giving for 9/11 took the form of stories.
In contrast to stories, codes need not bear much explanatory weight so long as they conform to the available rules. (When I served the U.S. Navy as a rule-wielding supply and disbursing officer, veteran Chief Petty Officer Edward McGroarty, who helped train me on the job, used to joke, "There's no reason for it: it's just policy!") Religious prescriptions, law codes, and prestigious systems of honors overflow with reasons, but those reasons describe how what happened con forms to the code at hand rather than what actually caused the out come. Third parties such as judges, priests, and awards committees figure extensively in the giving of reasons according to codes.
When we wanted to copy some crucial and voluminous nineteenth century household records from Milan, Louise Tilly and I had an instructive encounter with codes proposed by Ragionier [Accoun tant] Ciampan, director of Milan's municipal archives. First the Ragi onier dismissed us by insisting that only the city's mayor could autho rize outsiders to use the records. When we pulled strings and actually returned with a letter from the mayor, I asked the Ragionier when I chapter one could start setting up my camera. The small man strode to a huge book of municipal regulations on their stand by the window, opened to a passage declaring that "no one external to the archives may pho tograph their contents," placed his hand on the great book, raised his other hand in the air, and declared, "I am bound by the law." We painfully copied the records by hand.
Even victims of codes often accept them as judgments. David Pat terson (whom we will meet again in chapter 3) suffered from the electronic industry's contraction in the mid-1980s. During the de cade's early prosperous years, his firm had promoted him from an executive position in its California office to a division headship in the New York metropolitan area. He had moved his family, including two teenagers, into a prosperous New York suburb. The kids made painful adjustments to the move. Then, during the mid-1980s slump, the company closed his division, terminated him, and gave him four weeks' severance pay. He could not find another executive job. De spite that, he gave Katherine Newman a coded reason for his plight: "A policy is a policy and a procedure is a procedure. That's the way you operate. If you're part of the corporate world you understand. It doesn't make you feel better; it doesn't smooth anything, but that's the way you do it. You accept it . . . otherwise you can't work in that environment. . . . If I got back into the game, I'd play it the same way. And I would expect the same things to happen to me again" (Newman 1988: 77) . Of course, all of us have cursed at stupid policies from time to time. But, for those who play the game, codes have an air of inevitability, even of sanctity.
Finally, technical accounts vary enormously with regard to internal structure and content, but they have in common the claim to identify reliable connections of cause and effect. As he reflected on his futile attempt to kick open a fireproof door on the World Trade Center's 76th floor, Gerry Gaeta supplemented his initial story about the ter 19 why give reasons?
rorists' foresight with a cause-effect account based on his expertise as an architect. Structural engineers center their cause-effect connec tions in mechanical principles, physicians in the dynamics of organ isms, and economists in market-driven processes. Although engi neers, physicians, and economists sometimes spend great energy in justifying their expertise when under attack, earnestly demonstrating that they reached their conclusions by widely accepted professional procedures, on the whole they center their giving of reasons on puta tive causes and effects. Whole professions and organized bodies of professional knowledge stand behind them.
Roughly speaking, then, reasons why distribute this way:
Popular Specialized Formulas

Conventions Codes
Cause-Effect Accounts Stories Technical Accounts
From left to right, the diagram represents the extent to which ordered, disciplined, internally coherent schemes dominate reason giving, with "popular" reasons being widely accessible, and "specialized" reasons relying on extensive training in the discourse. Top to bottom, the dia gram runs from X-to-Y matching, in which criteria of appropriateness rather than causality prevail (formulas), to tracing of causal processes from X to Y (cause-effect accounts). Obviously, the scheme orders claims made by givers and/or accepted by receivers rather than any judgment of their adequacy by third parties, including you and me. All four kinds of reasons commonly do relational work. The most invisible work simply confirms the relation between giver and receiver, for example as a penitent accepts a priest's interpretation of her sins and the priest's prescription for proper recompense to man and God in a code that has little or nothing to do with causes and effects. More chapter one visibly, reason giving often establishes relations, as in the case of an interviewer who explains the purpose of a survey when calling to ask about preferences in food, television, or politics. It sometimes negotiates relations, as when the author of a technical account displays professional credentials to make a claim on a listener's respect and compliance. Finally, much reason giving repairs relations, as someone who has inflicted damage on someone else tells a story to show that the damage was inadvertent or unavoidable and therefore, despite appearances, does not reflect badly on the relationship between giver and receiver. The phrase "I'm sorry, but . . . " often starts a story that does relational repairs. Both formulas and cause-effect accounts do relational work.
Formulas identify an appropriate correspondence between Y (the event, action, or outcome at hand) and X (its antecedent), but enter little or not at all into the causal chain connecting Y to X. Causeeffect accounts trace causal lines from X to Y-even if we observers find those causal lines absurd or incomprehensible. "Popular" rea sons obviously vary from one public to another, for example as a function of religiosity and religious creed. Specialized reasons like wise vary strikingly from discipline to discipline; theologians elabo rate both codes and technical accounts that differ deeply from those proposed by medical practitioners. Sophisticated readers should guard against an easy and erroneous pair of assumptions: that popular reasons peddle inferior, ignorant, and excessively simplified versions of codes and technical accounts, and that truly sophisticated people therefore never resort to conven tions or stories. We sophisticates easily make the mistake because we frequently have to translate our own codes or technical accounts into terms that people who work in other idioms will understand. Russell Hardin makes a necessary distinction between knowledge that a "super-knower" might have available-for example, knowledge em In everyday life, we all deploy practical knowledge. We draw practical knowledge not only from individual experience but also from the social settings in which we live. Practical knowledge ranges from log ics of appropriateness (formulas) to credible explanations (cause-ef fect accounts). Appropriateness and credibility vary from one social setting to another. Different pairs of givers and receivers therefore offer contrasting types of reasons for the same event. Consider 9/11. We have already seen witnesses and participants offering conventions ("this is war" and "this is terror") as well as stories ("terrorists deliberately crashed their planes"), and have received hints of technical accounts in Gerry Gaeta's explanation of how the crash jammed World Trade Center fire doors. Since that time, engineers and physicists have spent a great deal of time reconstructing how the impact of two aircraft (more importantly, as it turned out, the ignition of their fuel) brought down "It seemed like three days" could work perfectly well in casual con versation, but would never pass the test of a trial transcript. We catch the defense attorney in the act of translating from the language of convention into the idioms of codes. Watching medical interviews or religious catechisms, we can likewise witness translation from ordi nary conversation into specialists' accounts. Still, the four typesconventions, stories, codes, technical accounts-distinguish forms of reason giving that most people encounter fairly often, and can easily tell apart. No one has yet analyzed sufficiently broad and ample evidence on reason giving to back definitive general answers to these questions. Still, an unexpected analogy helps make sense of variation in the giv ing and receiving of reasons. Reason giving resembles what happens when people deal with unequal social relations in general.
2 Partici pants in unequal social relations may detect, confirm, reinforce, or challenge them, but as they do so they deploy modes of communica tion that signal which of these things they are doing. In fact, the ability to give reasons without challenge usually accompanies a posi tion of power. In extreme cases such as high public offices and orga nized professions, authoritative reason giving comes with the terri 25 why give reasons?
tory.
3 Whatever else happens in the giving of reasons, givers and receivers are negotiating definitions of their equality or inequality.
Here are some possibilities that the analogy between negotiation of inequality and reason giving suggests:
• Within their own jurisdictions, professional givers promote and en force the priority of codes and technical accounts over conventions and stories.
• In particular, professional givers generally become skilled at translat ing conventions and stories into their preferred idioms, and at coach ing other people to collaborate in that translation.
• Hence the greater the professionalization of knowledge in any social setting, the greater the predominance of codes and technical accounts.
• To the extent that relations between giver and receiver are distant and/or giver occupies a superior rank, giver provides formulas rather than cause-effect accounts.
• Givers who offer formulas thereby claim superiority and/or distance.
• Receivers ordinarily challenge such claims, when they do, by de manding cause-effect accounts.
• Those demands typically take the forms of expressing skepticism about the proposed formula and asking for detail on how and why Y actually occurred.
• In the case of authoritatively delivered codes, however, a skilled re ceiver can also challenge the reasons given by deploying the code and demonstrating that giver has misused it.
• Even in the presence of distance and/or inequality, to the extent that receiver has visible power to affect giver's subsequent welfare, giver moves from formulas toward cause-effect accounts. In an extraordinary book about illness that will serve us well later on, Anatole Broyard describes waiting for the Boston urologist who would first diagnose his ultimately fatal prostate cancer:
While I waited I subjected the doctor to a preliminary semiotic scrutiny.
Sitting in his office, I read his signs. The diplomas I took for granted:
What interested me was the fact that the room was furnished with taste.
There were well-made, well-filled bookcases, an antique desk and chairs, a reasonable Oriental rug on the floor. A window opened one entire wall of the office to the panorama of Boston, and this suggested status, an earned respect. I imagined the doctor taking the long view out of his window. (Broyard 1992: 35) To Broyard's great disappointment, the office did not belong to his urologist, who took him to another office that "turned out to be mod ern and anonymous. There were no antiques, no Oriental rug, and no pictures that I could see" (Broyard 1992: 35) . By Broyard's high chapter one standards, the "impostor" failed to qualify as the physician of his hopes. But the story underlines the connections among standing, markers of that standing, and the capacity to issue credible technical accounts.
Not that lay observers automatically accept professional authority. Henry Petroski begins his superb analysis of engineering failures and successes with this anecdote: The Hyatt Regency skywalk disaster of 1981 killed 114 people. That was the largest number of people ever to die in an American struc ture's collapse until 9/11 took its grim toll. In the press, the courts, professional journals, and general conversation the 1981 debacle generated stories, codes, and technical accounts alike, each feeding the others. Cole and Bird's hypothetical physician would most likely be capable of giving a technical account of how colon cancers form. The physi cian in question could no doubt indicate, furthermore, which causeeffect relations within that account remain unclear or contested in the present state of knowledge. A physician's consultation on the case with colleagues generally follows just such protocols. He or she, how ever, rarely offers the patient a technical account. Although the text book does not explicitly put it this way, the physician is transmitting a radically simplified technical account through two filters: one that translates the message into a language that the patient can interpret as reasons for an exceptional event, another that buffers the emo tional shock of those reasons.
In their professional lives, physicians employ all the different varie ties of reasons: conventions for routine problems, codes for their con formity to hospital rules, technical accounts for their consultations on difficult diagnoses, and stories for patients who lack the medical knowledge to follow the relevant technical accounts-not to mention stories physicians tell each other about cantankerous patients they have had to deal with. In some zone of expertise, however, almost every adult engages in the same sort of shifting among reasons. A New York taxi driver can give you a code for the extra fare he charges in the evening, a technical account of his circuitous path to your des tination, a story for the music on his radio, or a conventional reason for his failure to follow your instructions. Most of us feel more com fortable challenging the reasons given by taxi drivers than those pro posed by physicians. But in either case we are, among other things, negotiating definitions of the relations between us.
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